This book presents a comprehensive examination of Gottfried Leibniz'sviews on the nature of agents and their actions. Julia Jorati offers a fresh look at controversial topics including Leibniz's doctrines of teleology, the causation of spontaneous changes within substances, divine concurrence, freedom, and contingency, and also discusses widely neglected issues such as his theories of moral responsibility, control, attributability, and compulsion. Rather than focusing exclusively on human agency, she explores the activities of nonrational substances and the differences between distinctive types of actions, showing how the will, appetitions, and teleology are key to Leibniz'sdi sc u ssions of agency. Her book reveals that Leibniz has a nuanced and compelling philosophy of action that has relevance for present-day discussions of agency. It will be of interest to scholars and students of early modern philosophy as well as to metaphysicians and philosophers of action.
There is some overlap between this book and material already published elsewhere: Chapters 2 and 3 contain some of the material from Jorati (2015) and (2013); Chapter 4 contains some material from von Bodelschwingh (Jorati) (2011). I thank the publishers for their permission to use this material. 
Note on Translations and Citations
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